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COMMENT
ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: THE
UNCONSCIONABILITY OF ALIMONY
PAYMENTS FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
SURVIVORS TO THEIR ABUSERS
AMANDA NANNARONE ∗
In 2017, the #MeToo movement took social media by storm when
individuals from all walks of life began openly sharing their experiences with
sexual violence and gender-based harassment for the first time. Starting in the
employment space and moving to other areas, the movement encouraged legal
changes that improve gender equality. Alimony, which has received little
scholarly attention in recent years, became of interest to #MeToo reformers who
discovered current laws failed to adequately serve survivors’ interests by forcing
them to pay spousal support to their abusive ex-spouse. Instead of a uniform
system that removed the possibility of survivors being required to pay spousal
support to their abusers, lawyers and clients face a patchwork of statutes that
vary wildly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions prohibit
considering any evidence of marital misconduct, while others leave it solely to
the court’s discretion. California is the only state that has affirmatively enacted
legislation disqualifying alimony payments from survivors to abusers.
As state legislatures continually fail to implement proper laws, survivors’
only hope in having alimony provisions in divorce settlements invalidated lies
∗ Senior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 69; J.D.
Candidate, May 2020, American University Washington College of Law; B.A.,
Communications, Legal Institutions, Economics, and Government, American
University. I dedicate this Comment to survivors of domestic violence. To those
survivors: you are strong, you are brave, and you are not alone. Your stories matter
and your voices are heard. #MeToo.
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in judges’ hands. Courts have used contract law for centuries to protect
vulnerable people from being taken advantage of in their dealings with more
powerful individuals. Particularly, the doctrine of unconscionability began as
an equitable doctrine that courts invoked as a way to restrict enforcement of
harsh, biting, and unreasonably one-sided agreements. Judges today can
continue to use the doctrine of unconscionability as a way to deny enforcing
divorce settlements that require survivors of domestic violence to pay spousal
support to their convicted abusers because those payments represent a
continuation of abuse and control. Survivors’ freedom from abuse should not
be obtained at such an unreasonably steep price and judges have the power to
end that once and for all. Allowing this practice to go on creates fresh wounds
on top of barely healed flesh, adds insult to indescribable injury, and prevents
survivors from ever truly being free. In the #MeToo era, that is not acceptable.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, the #MeToo movement took over social media,
spurring a cultural revolution.1 The movement centers on giving a voice to
individuals, primarily women, who have been affected by gender-based
violence.2 #MeToo empowers survivors from all walks of life to discuss how
domestic violence, sexual harassment, and sexual assault have impacted
their lives, forcing both lawmakers and the courts to take notice and
reevaluate their prior practices.3 As the movement continues to grow, many
areas of law that have not received #MeToo attention will be addressed in
the courts as tolerance for these unconscionable acts continues to dissipate.
In particular, alimony is beginning to draw the attention of #MeToo
advocates. In its series on #MeToo developments, Buzzfeed News reports
that many states require domestic violence survivors to pay alimony to
their convicted abusers as part of divorce settlements. 4 A study done by
the American Bar Association in 2013 corroborated this finding.5 This
practice presents an issue of grave importance in family law courts across
the country, as survivors challenge their duty to pay the individual who
inflicted the severe mental, emotional, and/or physical trauma that
caused the divorce.
Several states have already begun the process of reevaluating their
laws in this area. California is currently the only state that disqualifies
perpetrators of all kinds of abuse from receiving alimony payments
from their victims. 6 Other states, like Virginia and New Jersey, have
attempted to reform the system to prevent judges from even
considering alimony payments if the recipient of the payments has a

1. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-ofmetoo/542979 [https://perma.cc/Z9CX-87AJ].
2. Anna North, The #MeToo Movement and Its Evolution, Explained, VOX (Oct. 11,
2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/10/9/17933746/me-toomovement-metoo-brett-kavanaugh-weinstein [https://perma.cc/654H-2D3E].
3. Id.
4. Robert F. Kelly & Greer Litton Fox, Determinants Of Alimony Awards: An
Empirical Test of Current Theories and a Reflection on Public Policy, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV.
641, 642–43 (1993) (“Indeed, it appears likely that public policy analysis and legal
discourse concerning alimony will intensify in coming years.”); Ariane Lange, The Law
Made These Women Pay Up To Get Out of Their Abusive Marriages, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 5,
2018, 8:31 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/arianelange/abusive-marriagesalimony-me-too-crystal-harris [https://perma.cc/3CYC-3W9N].
5. Amber James et al., Chart 1: Alimony/Spousal Support Factors, 46 FAM. L. Q. 522,
522–23 (2013).
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4325 (West 2019).
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domestic violence conviction involving the payor, but those attempts
have been unsuccessful.7 The majority of the states follow a permissive
approach, which gives judges discretion to consider domestic violence
convictions as a potentially relevant factor when ordering alimony
payments, resulting in inconsistent application. 8 In Nevada, domestic
abuse is not considered a “compelling reason” for an unequal
distribution of assets.9 Such a discretionary, unpredictable system is
counterproductive to the goals of family law courts and troublesome for
many survivors attempting to break free from their abusers. As state
legislatures continuously fail to act, survivors must look to judges to deny
and invalidate problematic alimony awards.
While challenging these alimony provisions through the political
process has been largely futile,10 analyzing divorce settlements and
associated alimony from a contract law perspective could prove to be an
effective solution in the courts. Although only one court has tangentially
considered the idea,11 the doctrine of unconscionability provides a strong
legal basis for prohibiting alimony payments from survivors to abusers in
divorce settlements. This Comment argues courts should mandate that
abusers be automatically disqualified from receiving alimony payments in
divorces where the spouse receiving alimony has a criminal conviction for
domestic violence against the other spouse because the unequal
bargaining power of the parties, absence of meaningful choice, and
unreasonable benefit to one party make these payments unconscionable.
7. A.B. 399, 218th Legis., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018); H.B. 2105, 2015 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015). The New Jersey bill is stalled in the state house and the
Virginia bill failed to pass.
8. Compare In re Fenzau, 54 P.3d 43, 47 (Mont. 2002) (holding that
consideration of abuse and other marital misconduct was properly used in making a
determination), with In re Marriage of Casias, 962 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo. App. 1998)
(holding considerations of fault or marital misconduct are not relevant except under
very narrow circumstances insofar as the misconduct had economic consequences).
The District of Columbia has also taken steps to address this issue with a D.C. Council
Member proposing legislation, nicknamed Elaine’s Bill, that would prohibit abusers
from “profit[ing] from [their] misdeeds.” See Samantha Schmidt, She Reported that Her
Husband Abused Her. Then the Divorce Became ‘Another Form of Abuse.’, WASH. POST (Feb.
4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/she-reported-thather-husband-abused-her-then-the-divorce-became-another-form-ofabuse/2019/02/04/efa7ed8e-2653-11e9-90cd-dedb0c92dc17.
9. E.g., Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam)
(holding that the court must defer to the legislature and since it remained silent on this
particular issue citizens should use political process to enact changes in the legislation).
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
11. In re Marriage of Kelkar, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905, 912, 916–17 (Ct. App. 2014).
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Part I introduces the principles underlying the formation and
negotiation of contracts and discusses contract defenses as they were
derived from the common law. Part I also examines the origins of divorce
law and alimony practices and gives an overview of the psychological
impact that trauma has on survivors. Part II analyzes how the doctrine of
unconscionability can be applied to strike down divorce settlement
provisions that require survivors to pay alimony to their abusers. Part II
applies the elements of unconscionability derived from the common law
to determine that the unequal bargaining power and unreasonable onesidedness of the alimony provision benefit the abuser to the detriment
of the survivor. Part II finally analyzes the benefits and consequences of
courts using the doctrine of unconscionability to void alimony payments.
Part III provides several policy arguments as to why invalidating these
contracts is beneficial to survivors. Finally, this Comment concludes that in
light of society’s renewed commitment to protecting trauma survivors and
their interests, judges should automatically disqualify abusers from
receiving alimony payments from the individuals they harmed because
allowing anything else is unconscionable.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Forming and Negotiating Contracts
Contracts are one of the pillars of our society, providing the
foundation for a multitude of commercial transactions, from contracts
to build roads or schools to employment agreements to private dealings
between private citizens. Contracts must be executed properly and
contain all the necessary components to make them enforceable.12
Accordingly, all enforceable contracts must have the same basic
elements: agreement, bargain, which must be expressed by a valid offer
and acceptance, and consideration.13 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
defines a promise as a manifestation of intent to act or refrain from

12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A contract
is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”).
13. Peter A. Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 47 (2001) (“A
promise that represents the coincidence of an Agreement, a Bargain, and
Consideration is enforceable. If any one of those elements is missing, the promise is
not enforceable, not at all.”).
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acting between the promisor and promisee.14 An agreement is a
“manifestation of mutual assent,”15 the existence of which can be
observed through a party’s communications or overt acts.16 This element
is commonly referred to as the “meeting of the minds.”17
The second necessary element of a contract is the bargain. A bargain
is defined as an “agreement to exchange”18 and is the product of “offer”
and “acceptance.”19 An offer is when one party, the offeror, shows he is
willing to enter into a bargain, leading a second party, the offeree, to
understand he is invited to enter the bargain.20 An offer is valid based on
an objective reasonableness test, meaning that it includes reasonably
certain terms that would tell a reasonable person that an offer has been
made.21 An acceptance occurs when an offeree agrees to the terms of an

14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2. The manifestation of intent can
lead to many contract disputes as the parties may attach different meanings to the
same words or conduct. See id. § 2 cmt. b.
15. Id. § 3 (“An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two
or more persons.”).
16. Id. § 3 cmt. b (“Manifestation of assent may be made by words or by any other
conduct. Even silence in some circumstances is such a manifestation.”).
17. Id. § 17 cmt. c. In cases where courts have found a mutual misunderstanding
of a material contract term, they have held there was not a sufficient meeting of the
minds and thus invalidated the contract. See, e.g., Bayou Rapides Corp. v. Dole, 165
So. 3d 373, 378–81 (La. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that there was no contract between
the parties when communication was informal and no formal written contract was
created); Vohs v. Donovan, 777 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the
contingency in the contract stating that the sale was subject to the sellers “obtaining [a]
home of their choice” was not illusory); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 20 (outlining the effect of misunderstanding between parties).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (“A bargain is an agreement to
exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange
performances.”).
19. Id. § 3 cmt. d.
20. Id. § 24.
21. To determine if an offer exists, courts may look at the subject of the offer,
price (or what is being asked for), who the offer is meant for, and if the terms are
tailored to those individuals. In some cases, advertisements have been held as valid
offers to contract. See, e.g., Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 772–73 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that Macy’s offer to become “Broadway’s New ‘Annie’” was a valid offer to
contract); Steinberg v. Chi. Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 639–40 (Ill. 1977) (holding
that a college brochure describing criteria for assessing applicants was a valid offer);
Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc., 561 A.2d 1248, 1250–51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding
that Chevrolet’s advertisement giving away one of their cars for making a hole-in-one
was a valid offer). But see Moulton v. Kershaw, 18 N.W. 172, 174–75 (Wis. 1884)
(holding that advertisement terms were too general to be considered a valid offer to contract).
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offer and communicates that approval to the offeror in the manner
required by the contract. 22
The final element of a contract is consideration. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts explains that consideration is the product of a
bargain between the parties. 23 Valid consideration requires a
sufficient exchange between the parties that balances both their
interests. 24 Sufficiency is a largely fact-driven determination that
involves looking at the promises made between the parties and
requires more than a nominal exchange. 25
The enforceability of a contract relies on the presence of these
three elements because they legally bind the parties to perform the
obligations as bargained for. 26 If one party fails to perform, the other
party can file suit for damages for breach of contract or attempt to
compel performance. 27 Subsequently, the breaching party can
respond to the suit by raising a number of contract defenses.

22. An acceptance must be made by the mode required by the contract. If the
contract does not have an exclusive method of acceptance, a party can accept
through either promise or performance of their end of the bargain. See Allied Steel &
Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 277 F.2d 907, 910–11, 913 (6th Cir. 1960) (per
curiam) (holding that a suggested acceptance method was not an exclusive
acceptance method); Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d 1026, 1029–31 (Cal. 1934) (holding
that a bilateral contract was established when only a promise to perform, rather than
actual performance, was requested); Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A. 106, 107 (Me.
1917) (holding that performance binds the other party to act on their side of the
bargain in unilateral contracts).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (explaining how consideration
can come in the form of money, promises, or forbearance from certain acts).
24. See Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691, 692
(Mass. 1989) (holding a contract was never formed because the deceased’s oral
promise to donate to the congregation did not have valid consideration, as he gained
no benefit in the deal); Earle v. Angell, 32 N.E. 164, 164 (Mass. 1892) (finding a
promise of future performance is good consideration); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256,
257 (N.Y. 1891) (finding forbearance is good consideration).
25. See Fischer v. Union Trust Co., 101 N.W. 852, 854 (Mich. 1904) (holding a
daughter’s payment of one dollar to her father in exchange for his payment on her
mortgages did not form a valid contract because one dollar or mere affection does
not constitute sufficient consideration).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. a (“Ordinarily when parties
make such an agreement, they not only regard the promises themselves as the
subject of an exchange, but they also intend that the performances of those promises
shall subsequently be exchanged for each other.”).
27. See id. §§ 346, 357.
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B. Contract Defenses and the Doctrine of Unconscionability
Breaching parties can challenge breach of contract claims by using
defenses to justify the failure to perform. 28 When evaluating contract
defenses, the court must decide whether the breaching party’s
unique circumstances excuse performance. 29 The elements of each
defense vary among different states. 30 The defenses can be applied to
the contract as a whole or to individual clauses. 31 If a defense is
applied only to an individual clause, courts would use the practice of
severance, meaning the rest of the contract would remain
enforceable and only specified clauses would be unenforceable. 32
Unconscionability is one of many contract defenses that breaching
parties can raise. The doctrine of unconscionability began as a commonlaw defense in courts of equity. 33 From its inception, the doctrine of
unconscionability gave courts the power to invalidate harsh or
oppressive bargains.34 Equity courts saw this defense as a way to protect
marginalized groups from agreements that took advantage of their
weaknesses. 35 Courts of law were less likely to use the doctrine,
28. Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and Intent, 56 KAN. L. REV. 473,
474 (2008) (“There are, however, situations where the parties have entered into a
bargain and then sought either to avoid enforcement or to reform the contract terms.”).
29. Debora L. Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons From Arthur Murray on
Gender and Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 754 (2010) (explaining how
prevailing under contract defenses requires plaintiffs to plead for special protection).
30. Most states have adopted the elements from the Restatement with some
legislatures adding additional elements. Compare, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-4-3
(2019) (defining five factors that could sustain a duress defense), with CAL CIV. CODE
§ 1569 (West 2019) (defining three factors that could sustain a duress defense).
While the South Dakota and California laws overlap to some extent, South Dakota’s
law enumerates two situations—“actual or threatened unlawful violent injury to the
person or property,” and “actual or threatened injury to the character of any such
person or persons”—that could potentially be used to show duress for which
California’s law does not account. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-4-3(3)–(4).
31. 15 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 89.4 (2019).
32. Id. (“If the attainment is wholly avoided, if the degree of impropriety is not
great, and if enforcement in part is not unfair and unreasonable, the court should be
justified in declaring that the transaction is partially enforceable.”).
33. Asifa Quraishi, Comment, From a Gasp to a Gamble: A Proposed Test for
Unconscionability, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 191 (1991) (noting the concept of
unconscionability started in equity courts that have been more willing and forceful in
applying the doctrine than courts of law).
34. See id. at 192 (noting equity courts denied specific performance of a contract
when the terms would cause severe hardship to one of the parties).
35. Id. (explaining how early courts applying the equitable doctrine of
unconscionability sought to protect the “widows and the weak-minded”).
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oftentimes upholding oppressive deals as long as the necessary
contract elements were present. 36 For this reason, early common-law
cases provided little clarity on a specific definition or test to apply
when analyzing potentially unconscionable contracts. 37 Common-law
courts applied the subjective gap test for years before the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) clarified and codified the doctrine. 38
Section 2-302 states as follows:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result. 39

However, the UCC fails to give a bright-line test for unconscionability
and instead merely provides guidelines for remediating the “tainted”
contract.40 Furthermore, the UCC only applies to a narrow set of
contracts for the sale of goods and thus does not cover the settlements
discussed in this Comment. In lieu of statutory or UCC guidance,
courts must rely upon the common law in defining unconscionability.

36. Id. at 192–93 (describing how courts at law struggled with the competing
priorities of equity and freedom of contract and explaining that these courts
sometimes prioritized laissez-faire market principles over fair or equitable results).
37. Id. at 194 (analyzing how most early common-law unconscionability cases
provided very vague definitions).
38. U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); Quraishi, supra
note 33, at 194–95.
39. Id.
40. In the official comments to § 2-302, it states “[t]his section is intended to
make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses
which they find to be unconscionable.” Id. cmt. 1. While this provides judges with
guidance on how to address issues as they arise, neither the text of the section nor
the comments provide a specific definition for what constitutes “unconscionability.”
State legislatures have not been any more helpful in providing a clear definition in
their statutes. Most states have adopted the UCC language in its entirety in their
individual state contract codes and thus also fail to provide a clear unconscionability
test or standard. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-302 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:2302 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 400.2-302 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-302 (2019);
WIS. STAT. § 402.302 (2019). Oddly enough, looking at these same states’ property
codes reveals that the state legislatures provided clear definitions of
unconscionability for property contracts. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-112 (2019);
MO. REV. STAT. § 448.1-112 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 707.06 (2019); see also 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/502(b) (2018) (allowing judges to find property settlements unconscionable
after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant
factors brought up by the parties).
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Courts find unconscionability when a contract or contract term is
grossly one-sided, providing benefit to one party while unnecessarily
impoverishing the other.41 Courts can also find unconscionability when
the parties have grossly unequal bargaining power.42 In these cases, one
party typically takes advantage of the other’s relatively weakened position
or mental state to procure a better deal.43 However, this factor is not
entirely dispositive. If the parties have relatively equal bargaining power, a
court could still find unconscionability.44 Finally, courts can find
unconscionability when one party lacks meaningful choice and cannot
avoid the unconscionable obligation.45 Unconscionability is often a difficult
defense to prove; however, parties may be more likely to succeed on this
defense if they can show two or more of the above elements are present.46
The Third Circuit provided a strong foundation for understanding
unconscionability in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 47 a seminal case in
unconscionability doctrine. In Campbell Soup, Campbell sued the
41. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 31, § 29.4 (“Typically the cases in which courts
have found unconscionability involve gross overall one-sidedness or gross one-sidedness
of a term disclaiming a warranty, limiting damages, or granting procedural advantages.”).
42. Id. (explaining how inequality of bargaining power is an important
consideration in determining unconscionability).
43. Id. (citing cases where the stronger party exploited by a weaker party because of
the weaker party’s ignorance, feebleness, lack of sophistication, or general naiveté).
44. Id. (“Unconscionability, however, may exist even where the parties are on
‘about equal footing’ or even where the oppressor is inexperienced compared to the
oppressed.”); see, e.g., Elite Logistics Corp. v. Hanjin Shipping Co., 589 Fed. App’x
817, 818 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding arbitration clause in agreement between both
corporations was unconscionable even though both companies approached the deal
with relatively equal resources because Elite had to accept the terms or risk losing the
business relationship); Paduano v. Express Scripts, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 3d 400, 418–19
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding clause that eliminated the plaintiff corporation’s discovery
during arbitration unconscionable because it limited plaintiff’s ability to effectively
vindicate its rights despite the agreement being procedurally fair to the parties);
Miller v. Coffeen, 280 S.W.2d 100, 103–04 (Mo. 1954) (en banc) (acknowledging the
parties likely had similar bargaining power but holding other factors warranted a
finding of unconscionability).
45. Id. (citing cases where individuals were forced to accept “take it or leave it”
contract terms).
46. Id. (“Most claims of unconscionability fail. The mere fact that there is a lack
of equivalence between the performances of the parties does not even get close to
the establishment of unconscionability. A harsh result alone is an insufficient ground
for a finding of unconscionability.”); see Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952,
954 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (“A promisor can be relieved of his obligation, of course, but only
when the transaction affronts the sense of decency without which business is mere
predation and the administration of justice an exercise in bookkeeping.”).
47. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
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Wentzes for specific performance of a contract. 48 The contract
required the Wentzes, owners of a small Pennsylvania farm, to sell
Campbell, a New Jersey corporation, a specific quantity of carrots at a
set price between twenty-three and thirty dollars per ton. 49 The
Wentzes, upon learning the market value of the carrots was upwards
of ninety dollars per ton, refused to perform their obligation to
Campbell and sold to another buyer for a higher price. 50 Campbell
filed to enjoin further sale by the Wentzes and compel performance
of the contract. 51 While the Third Circuit found that specific
performance was the correct remedy for a case of this nature, it
affirmed the lower court’s ruling for the Wentzes under the theory
that the contract was “too one-sided an agreement to entitle the
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience.” 52 The Third Circuit relied
on several one-sided provisions in the contract, including a provision for
liquidated damages upon breach by the Wentzes and another allowing
Campbell to refuse deliveries under certain circumstances.53 Specifically,
the Third Circuit was troubled by provisions precluding the Wentzes
from both holding the corporation liable for any carrots not accepted
and from reselling the rejected carrots, effectively leaving the Wentzes
with excess product and lost profit.54 Under those facts, the court found
Campbell had clearly drafted the contract with only its interest in mind
at the expense of the Wentzes. 55
In Miller v. Coffeen, 56 a subsequent case with similar facts, Coffeen
executed a contract to sell his home for $2400 to Miller, even though
the property was valued at $12,000. 57 When Coffeen realized the deal
was unfair, he attempted to back out of the sale, but Miller sued to
compel specific performance of the contract. 58 The court held that
even though courts generally support freedom of contract in
particularly hard bargains, the facts in Miller coupled with the gross

48. Id. at 81.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 83 (highlighting that the contract had “quite obviously been drawn by
skilful draftsmen with the buyer’s interests in mind”).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 280 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
57. Id. at 102.
58. Id.
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inadequacy of consideration made the deal inherently unfair. 59
Specifically, the court noted how Coffeen’s age and inexperience in
being a property owner were relevant in determining the fairness of
the deal. 60 Those characteristics, coupled with contract terms that
disadvantaged Coffeen and bolstered Miller’s financial position, 61
created circumstances where enforcement would have gone against
notions of justice and fairness. 62
These prior cases focused primarily on unreasonable one-sided
bargains but failed to delve into other unconscionability elements,
such as difference in bargaining power and absence of meaningful
choice. In later cases, courts began to address how the power differential
between the parties and the practice of “take it or leave it” deals were
critical in addressing unconscionability. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,63 the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated a contract
that limited the amount of damages a couple could recover under the
contract’s warranty clause as unconscionable under the circumstances.64
The purchase order signed by the Henningsens contained a clause that
precluded any manufacturing or product defect claims that fell outside a
ninety-day warranty period. 65 However, the clause was placed threequarters of the way down on the back of the form in small font
without any headings or margins indicating the presence of such an
important provision. 66 Further, the signature line was on the front of
the form along with two barely legible paragraphs telling the buyers
that by signing, they fully agreed to all the terms laid out on both sides
of the contract.67 The drafters' concerted efforts to de-emphasize these
clauses troubled the court.68 Upon review of other similar automobile

59. Id.
60. Id. at 104.
61. Id. at 106.
62. Id. (“In short, in view of the shocking inadequacy of the consideration and the
presence of the noted inequitable factors, enforcement of the contract would impose an
unreasonable, disproportionate hardship upon the defendant, Coffeen, and, in all the
circumstances, the justice of the decree of specific performance is not made to appear.”).
63. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
64. Id. at 76.
65. Id. at 74.
66. Id. at 73.
67. Id. (highlighting that the provisions at issue were some of the most important
in the contract but were difficult to read and “nothing about the format . . . would
draw the reader’s eye to them”).
68. Id. (noting that most of the form was written in easy-to-read 12-point block print
while the most important paragraphs were printed very close together in six-point script).
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purchase orders, the court found that this de-emphasis was common
industry practice, thereby forcing consumers into agreeing to these
terms without any choice.69 As such, the crux of the court’s ruling in
favor of the Henningsens focused on their lack of meaningful choice in
entering into or negotiating the contract. 70
In a similar case, Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 71 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the denial of GM’s motion to dismiss because there was a
substantial showing that GM’s durational limitations on implied
warranties for defective diesel engines were unconscionable. 72 The
Fourth Circuit found the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of
the company’s superior bargaining power through its use of a highly
sophisticated, skillfully crafted contract. 73 Additionally, much like in
Henningsen, the plaintiffs were able to show the durational limitations
found in GM’s contracts were industry practice, offering them little
choice but to sign and accept the unfair policy. 74 More importantly,
Carlson helped further clarify what courts will look to when making
decisions about meaningful choice by stating “courts typically look to
the parties’ relative ‘bargaining power,’ ‘sophistication,’ ‘knowledge’
and ‘expertise’” as relevant. 75
In a watershed case on unconscionability, the D.C. Circuit followed
an approach similar to the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen.
In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 76 the D.C. Circuit
invalidated several unfair provisions of a furniture company’s sales
contracts. 77 The provisions at issue put the purchaser in default if any
balance remained from any previous purchase, even if one of the
items had been fully paid, since the purchaser was billed pro-rata. 78
Even if the cost of an item had been completely paid for, if another
item was purchased in the interim and the purchaser defaulted, the
store would consider everything purchased on credit as defaulted. 79
69. Id. at 84.
70. Id. at 86 (discussing how the weaker party is not usually in a position to look
around for better contract terms, and that the consumer may even be stuck with the
same contract terms from all contracting options).
71. 883 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 294.
73. Id. at 295–96.
74. Id. at 294.
75. Id. at 295.
76. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
77. Id. at 447.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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The court noted the clause was contained in small font on the
contract and that such a policy was so unusual that customers could
not reasonably be expected to consent to it if they had diminished
bargaining power. 80 In this particular case, Williams’ lack of formal
education, role as a single mother to seven children, and reliance on
public assistance put her in a weaker position to bargain, choose a
different store, or consent to such an impracticable deal. 81
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit held that unconscionability exists
when an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties is coupled with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable
to the other party. 82 This was the first time a court clearly laid out a
test for determining both meaningful choice and unreasonable
contract terms. 83 Furthermore, the court determined that a finding of
unconscionability specifically required consideration of the fairness
of the contract terms and the manner in which the contract was
entered. 84 Regarding unreasonable contract terms, the court’s test
relied on a finding that the terms were “so extreme as to appear
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the
time and place.” 85 The test for meaningful choice requires courts
examine whether each party, given their specific characteristics, had a
reasonable opportunity to understand the contract. 86 Instances of
deceptive sales practices and terms hidden in small print were both
recognized as important factors affecting one’s ability to fully
understand the deal. 87 The court also pointed out that the
meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of
bargaining power in many instances. 88

80. Id. at 449 (“But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real
choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its
terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his
consent, was ever given to all the terms.”).
81. Id. at 448–49.
82. Id. at 449.
83. Id. (“Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be
determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.”).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 450 (quoting 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963)) (stating that when
determining reasonableness or fairness, courts should consider the contract’s terms in light of
the circumstances it was made under—a complex test that cannot be “mechanically applied”).
86. Id. at 449.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Courts have also found contracts to be unconscionable in private
agreements between ordinary citizens or in the context of
employment. In Waters v. Min Ltd., 89 Waters’ boyfriend convinced her
to sell a $189,000 annuity (that would have totaled $694,000 over
twenty-five years) for substantially less money to satisfy his own bank
debt. 90 The plaintiff sold her annuity without consulting with her
attorney and then later brought suit for rescission of the contract,
arguing unconscionability. 91 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
found for Waters and stated that the contract would not be enforced
because she was involved in an accident many years prior that
reduced her cognitive abilities and made her susceptible to
influence. 92 Additionally, Waters had been abusing illicit substances
for years with the help and encouragement of her boyfriend. 93 The
court held that Waters’ impaired mental state and susceptibility to
her boyfriend’s influence led to an unequal bargaining power
between the parties. 94
Similarly, in Wollums v. Horsley, 95 Wollums, a disabled, elderly man
with little education or business knowledge, entered into a deal to
allow Horsley, a savvy oil and minerals real estate tycoon, access to
mine on Wollums’s farm for well below market value. 96 In holding
that the contract was unenforceable, the court emphasized that
Horsley took advantage of Wollums’s diminished capacity and lack of
knowledge as to the value of his property to procure a more favorable
bargain. 97 The court noted that courts of equity will only uphold
deals when, in light of all the facts, the contract and the interactions
between the parties appeared to be fair and just. 98 In this case, the
bargain did not meet that standard and thus could not in good
conscience be enforced. 99
Finally, in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, 100 a schoolteacher
agreed to resign from his job after school administrators took
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

587 N.E.2d 231 (Mass. 1992).
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
20 S.W. 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 1892).
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id.
Id.
54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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advantage of him and threatened him with reputational harm. 101 The
situation arose when the police arrested Odorizzi and questioned
him for hours regarding his sexual orientation. 102 After his release,
Odorizzi returned home where the school administrators accosted
him and forced him to resign, threatening public disclosure of his
sexual orientation and immediate termination from his job if he
refused. 103 Admitting that he had not been thinking rationally and
was unable to think clearly, Odorizzi acquiesced to the pressure and
formally resigned from his job. 104 Afterwards, Odorizzi sued to revoke
his resignation and reinstate his employment contract because he
had been cleared of the criminal charges and felt that school
administrators had unfairly compelled him to quit his job. 105 The
court held his resignation invalid and found the school had put
undue influence on Odorizzi by taking advantage of his clearly
deteriorating mental and emotional state. 106 Much like in Waters, the
court found Odorizzi had not been in a position to make a
meaningful choice or to understand the gravity of the situation and
that he clearly was the weaker party. 107 In both cases, the courts
looked to the parties’ mental state and susceptibility to influence as
factors in establishing their ability to advocate for themselves, which
are fundamental factors when analyzing a party’s bargaining power.
C. Divorce in the United States
Contract law is essential to divorce settlements given that parties
negotiate, agree to, and enforce the settlements like any other
contract. 108 While public law used to govern divorce, courts have
recently begun to consider divorce using traditional private law
contract doctrine. 109 Parties commonly negotiate divorces by
101. Id. at 538.
102. Id. at 537–38.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 540.
105. Id. at 537.
106. Id. at 540, 543.
107. See id. at 540; see also Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Mass. 1992)
(explaining that the “gross disparity” between the parties was a factor in the court’s
unconscionability finding).
108. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 701 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
109. Developments in the Law—Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The
Future of Antenuptial Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075, 2077 (2003) (explaining
that some states have begun to permit antenuptial agreements rather after many
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settlements that require the parties to mediate and come to an
agreement regarding child custody and division of assets and
property. 110 Courts use extra care when determining if they should
enforce divorce settlements by looking at several factors such as the
settlement’s complexity, subject matter, and the special conditions
under which the parties reach the settlement. 111 When a court
approves a settlement, it becomes a court order and binding
contract. 112 If either party violates any of the terms or conditions of
the settlement, the non-violating party can sue for breach or ask the
court to hold the violating party in contempt of a court order. 113
Despite the advent of no-fault divorce and mediation, divorce
settlements are generally “unhappy contracts” as they involve the
dissolution of marital property. 114 This makes the outcomes
unpredictable, especially when examining the specific circumstances
of each couple. 115 The bargaining skills of the parties, the quality and
help of their attorneys, and the anticipated benefit of going to court
if settlement tactics fail necessarily affect the results of the
settlement. 116 Other power dynamics, such as adultery, abuse, or
substance use disorders, also affect the outcome of settlement
negotiations. 117 If parties fail to agree on a divorce settlement, they
are subject to the will of the court, where the judge is the ultimate

years of holding such agreements invalid, demonstrating a shift “from a public status
conception of marriage to one based purely on contract”).
110. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1180–81 (1999).
111. Margaret F. Brinig, Are All Contracts Alike?, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 539 (2008)
(“About ninety percent of divorcing couples at some point file with the court what is variously
known as a separation agreement, a property settlement agreement, or a stipulation.”).
112. Id. at 540–41 (“This care may take the form of scrutiny for unconscionability or a
special attention to procedural regularity, assistance of counsel, and disclosure.”).
113. Id. at 539–40.
114. Id. at 541.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage,
54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 12–13 (2012) (noting that separation agreements have become
“the norm rather than the exception” in divorces and that courts are likely to enforce
such settlements in the absence of fraud or duress).
117. Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1537 (1983) (“[A] battered wife may be legally entitled to send
her husband to jail, but her economic incentive not to do so may be overwhelming . . . .
The husband and wife are treated as if they were equal bargaining partners, even though
women are in fact systematically subordinated to men.”).
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decision-maker. 118 Going to court is equally as unpredictable as
negotiating a settlement, especially depending on whether the state
utilizes a fault or no-fault divorce system.
Divorce has changed dramatically in the United States since the midtwentieth century, as changing societal views and norms made divorce
more acceptable.119 Divorce is either “fault-based” or “no-fault” in the
United States, with each state individually determining which system to
adopt.120 Accordingly, some states have a mixed system in which they
utilize both fault and no-fault divorces.121 Prior to 1969, all states
followed a fault-based divorce system, which allowed for the dissolution of
marriage only under certain circumstances.122 That year, California
became the first state to adopt an entirely no-fault system, which spawned
a revolution across the country.123 Soon a divorce revolution began, and
many states followed in California’s footsteps either by amending their
divorce statutes or outright repealing and replacing them.124
Legislatures justified implementing no-fault divorce laws for several
reasons. Primarily, no-fault divorces do not require a determination of
which party is innocent and which is guilty.125 No-fault divorce relies on
the incompatibility of the partners and their irreconcilable differences to
sustain the dissolution of marriage.126 This new focus makes divorces less
restrictive, coercive, and acrimonious and allows judges to be neutral as
they do not have to take a side or label one party as guilty.127 The second
purpose of the no-fault divorce system is to protect against collusion

118. See Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be a Problem-Solving
Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 268 (2007) (describing the Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement, or “BATNA,” as turning to a third party when negotiations
fail); see also Margaret F. Brinig, Unhappy Contracts: The Case of Divorce Settlements, 1 REV. L.
& ECON. 241, 260 (2005) (finding that divorces with fault considerations, such as domestic
violence and child abuse, were more likely to go to litigation than to settle).
119. Jane Biondi, Note, Who Pays for Guilt? Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals,
Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 612–13 (1999).
120. Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky & Pamela A. Monroe, The Effective Dates of No-Fault
Divorce Laws in the 50 States, 51 FAM. REL. 317, 317 (2002).
121. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV.
79, 89–90.
122. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 6.
125. See Vlosky & Monroe, supra note 120, at 317.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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between divorcing parties and migratory divorce.128 Commonly, a wife
and husband would fabricate a story to satisfy the grounds for divorce in
their state.129 Alternatively, with migratory divorce, one spouse would
move to another state with more favorable divorce laws and file there.130
By removing these barriers, no-fault divorce allows couples to dissolve
their marriage at will and arguably helps men and women in abusive
relationships.131
Despite these stated goals, no-fault divorce has been criticized and
deemed a failure due to its unintended economic and psychological
consequences, primarily on women and children.132 Critics argue that when
judges consider abuse in the alimony award, the injured spouse benefits
financially and in terms of safety.133 Accordingly, these critics advocate for
allowing fault-based considerations in cases of egregious marital
misconduct.134 This dichotomous system of fault-based or no-fault divorce
presents issues in other areas of judicial inquiry, namely alimony and
dissolution of marital property where the acknowledgement of egregious
marital misconduct is equally contentious.
D. Alimony in the United States
Alimony has been a part of the legal landscape for centuries, starting
as a remedy in courts of equity.135 The goal of alimony is to provide the
parties with the opportunity for a fresh start, while also ensuring the
lower-earning spouse has an equitable standard of living upon
divorce.136 Alimony requires looking at several factors, including, but not
limited to, the spouses’ earning capacity, total spousal assets, and

128. Id.
129. See Biondi, supra note 119, at 613.
130. Id.
131. See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM.
L.Q. 269, 270–71 (1997) (describing how the creation of no-fault divorce allowed
couples to divorce without having to fabricate a reason for their split).
132. Peter Nash Swisher, The ALI Principles: A Farewell to Fault-But What Remedy for the
Egregious Marital Misconduct of an Abusive Spouse?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 213, 214 (2001).
133. See Swisher, supra note 131, at 275–76.
134. Id.
135. See Rachel Biscardi, Dispelling Alimony Myths: The Continuing Need for Alimony
and the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (“Since 1785,
courts have employed alimony as an equitable remedy in divorce cases, recognizing
that during an intact marriage, spouses jointly decide how to divide responsibility for
childrearing, household maintenance, and paid work.”).
136. Judith G. McMullen, Alimony: What Social Science and Popular Culture Tell Us About
Women, Guilt, and Spousal Support After Divorce, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 41, 47 (2011).
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standard of living post-divorce.137 Alimony used to be “permanent,” as it
was awarded for life and paid in periodic payments of a specified sum. 138
Given the concerns raised by having to pay former spouses indefinitely
and widespread calls to reform this practice, most jurisdictions do not
permit permanent alimony without explicit statutory authorization.139
Instead, many states have begun to use rehabilitative alimony, which
looks to compensate lower-earning spouses only until they have, with
reasonable effort, become self-supporting.140 Thus, rehabilitative
alimony is limited in scope and promotes self-sufficiency.
The purpose of alimony is to recognize a spouse’s interest and then
compensate the spouse the proper amount of money for the time, labor,
and assets invested into the marriage.141 One theory of alimony is gain
theory, which looks to compensate spouses for the amount of marital
investment they put in to help raise future joint income.142 Another theory
of alimony is loss theory, which posits that alimony should compensate
spouses for relying on a failed marriage and thus losing earning capacity or
the opportunity to marry someone else.143 These competing ideals about
the purpose of alimony have manifested themselves differently, with loss
theory being less common as it relies on fault determinations.144

137. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 668 (Aug. 2019 Update).
138. David H. Kelsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and
Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1988) (“A court could increase,
decrease, or terminate alimony if the circumstances of the parties changed. Alimony
could continue until the death of the recipient or the payor. This traditional type of
alimony has become known as ‘permanent’ alimony.”).
139. See id. at 1–3.
140. Id. at 1–2.
141. Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 FAM. L.Q. 271, 279 (2011) (“Similarly,
identification and measurement of a spouse’s interest does not tell us whether that
interest is compensable, i.e., whether alimony is appropriate. Identification of a
spouse’s interest may be an important first step, but a satisfactory theory of alimony
must thus do more: it must explain why that interest is compensable.”).
142. The most common scenarios where gain theory can be observed is in the case
of one spouse contributing earnings or savings to the education of the other spouse,
or one spouse staying home and taking care of children to free up time for the other
spouse to advance his or her career. See id. at 280 (explaining that gain theory would
compensate a spouse who invested time to raise the family’s income for both
restitution and his or her share in the investment in the marriage).
143. Id. at 284. The aim with loss theory is to put lower-earning spouses in as good of a
position as they would have been in had the marriage continued. Unsurprisingly, loss theory
mirrors the contract remedy of expectation damages. For information on expectation
damages, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
144. Starnes, supra note 141, at 285.
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Much like a divorce, parties can negotiate alimony by discussing
the amount owed and then coming to an agreement written into a
settlement. 145 However, alimony is contentious and is often left for
the judge to decide. 146 If alimony is agreed upon in the settlement, it
can be enforced and litigated like any other provision in a contract. 147
If one party fails to pay, the other party can seek judicial
intervention. 148 The more common way alimony comes to court is
when one party challenges the validity of the agreement prior to
payment but after signing the settlement. 149 Alimony is still awarded
in divorces today, notwithstanding the advent of no-fault divorce. 150
The factors considered when determining alimony in no-fault
divorces vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with some of
them ignoring marital misconduct altogether.151 Before 1968, with very
few exceptions, courts considered marital misconduct when determining
spousal support.152 After the advent of no-fault divorce, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
accepted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which
advocated for a complete no-fault system.153 Two sections of the UMDA
stated that courts should determine spousal support “without regard to

145. Gaytri Kachroo, Mapping Alimony: From Status to Contract and Beyond, 5 PIERCE
L. REV. 163, 166 (2007) (stating that when a couple divorces, financial arrangements
for child support, inter-spousal maintenance, and property division are typical).
146. See Biscardi, supra note 135, at 5, 20 (stating that because of the difficulty in
settling alimony payments, more cases were brought to trial); see also Bryan, supra
note 110, at 1214 (finding settlement negotiations often fail when a wife demands
alimony from her ex-spouse).
147. John J. Michalik, Annotation, Divorce: Power of Court to Modify Decree for Alimony or
Support of Spouse Which Was Based on Agreement of Parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520 § 2(b) (1975).
148. See generally Linehan v. Linehan, 649 S.W.2d 837 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983)
(challenging validity of alimony settlement).
149. See Shipley v. Shipley, 807 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Ark. 1991) (examining whether
an agreement to pay alimony announced at a divorce proceeding was an
independent contract); see also Bryan, supra note 110, at 1239 (asserting that a wife
can later challenge an unfair agreement in court and petition for the agreement to
be set aside if the judge “fails to intercept” the unfair agreement initially).
150. Laura W. Morgan, Current Trends in Alimony: Where Are We Now?, A.B.A. (Apr. 1, 2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/april_201
2/current_trends_alimony_law (“Alimony continues to stumble along, based on habit and
precedent as much as logic, as part of the modern divorce case.”).
151. Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
773, 775 (1996).
152. See id. at 776; Kachroo, supra note 145, at 170 n.37.
153. Wardle, supra note 121, at 86–87.
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marital misconduct.”154 Some courts have adopted the language of the
UMDA, finding that even in cases of egregious marital misconduct,
allowing fault considerations for spousal support undermines the purpose
of a no-fault divorce because it forces judges to take sides and make
determinations of guilt. 155 Other courts have taken the opposite
approach and instead allow for egregious or serious marital
misconduct to be taken into account when making property or
spousal support determinations. 156 More generally, these states allow
for fault considerations in both divorce and alimony decisions.157
However, what constitutes “serious or egregious marital misconduct” is
largely up to the court’s discretion, and there is no clear standard from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction or even case to case. 158

154. See Ellman, supra note 151, at 776 (quoting UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§§ 307, 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987)).
155. See In re Marriage of Koch, 648 P.2d 406, 408 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Mosbarger v. Mosbarger, 547 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (applying nofault principles even where wife had attempted to murder her husband); In re
Marriage of Cihak, 416 N.E.2d 701, 702 (Ill. App. 1981) (refusing to consider that
respondent had murdered petitioner as a factor in dividing marital property).
156. See, e.g., Stover v. Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750, 751–52 (Ark. 1985) (finding
egregious marital misconduct when wife conspired to kill husband); Robinson v.
Robinson, 444 A.2d 234, 236 (Conn. 1982) (“While alimony, in whatever form, or an
assignment of property is not to be considered either as a reward for virtue or as a
punishment for wrongdoing, a spouse whose conduct has contributed substantially to
the breakdown of the marriage should not expect to receive financial kudos for his
or her misconduct.”); Jones v. Jones, 155 So. 3d 856, 863 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)
(holding husband’s cruelty and inhumane treatment was egregious marital
misconduct that warranted the unequal distribution of property); Brabec v. Brabec,
510 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (finding egregious marital misconduct
when wife solicited someone to murder her husband).
157. See Swisher, supra note 131, at 296 (“[A] substantial number of American
states still retain various fault grounds for divorce, and still utilize certain fault factors
in determining spousal support and determining the equitable distribution of
marital property on divorce.”).
158. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sommers, 792 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Kan. 1990)
(holding an extramarital affair had no economic consequences and therefore did
not reach the level of egregious marital fault); Smoot v. Smoot, 357 S.E.2d 728, 732
(Va. 1987) (holding spousal desertion was not a substantial cause of divorce and was
not egregious enough to be taken under advisement); Barnes v. Barnes, 428 S.E.2d
294, 296–97 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that wife’s post-separation adultery would
not bar her from receiving spousal support since their mutual acts, and not her
adultery, were the main cause of the divorce); Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (Va.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding husband’s misconduct did not have economic consequences
that led to the dissolution of marriage and therefore was irrelevant in determining
spousal support); O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323, 326 (Va. Ct. App. 1995)
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E. Current Status of Alimony Laws
As previously discussed, alimony statutes vary widely from state to
state and can generally be separated into four categories: (1) statutes
that expressly preclude courts from considering fault; 159 (2) statutes
that require courts to consider fault; 160 (3) statutes that permit, but
do not require, courts to consider fault; 161 and (4) statutes that
remain silent on considerations of fault, allowing courts to decide. 162
While the alimony practices differ, the statutes themselves are
surprisingly uniform in that most states include lists of factors that
either can or must be used in making alimony decisions.163 Remarkably,
despite the advent of no-fault divorce, most states recognize that fault
still potentially plays a role in alimony decisions.164
In examining the first category of alimony statutes, four states
expressly note that no inquiry shall be made into, and no evidence
shall be presented regarding, marital misconduct. 165 The second
category, which is the second-largest, includes twelve states that
permit, but that do not expressly require, the consideration of
marital fault when determining alimony. 166 Most notably, Virginia
originally planned to model its statute after the changes made by the
(concluding noneconomic fault can be relevant when it involves serious and
egregious marital misconduct that is the substantial cause of the marital breakdown).
159. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Fault as Consideration in Alimony, Spousal
Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 § 4 (1978).
160. See id. § 6.
161. See id. § 5.
162. See id. § 3(a)–(b).
163. Id. § 2(a) (“Accordingly, whether fault is to be considered in awarding
alimony or spousal support or determining property division pursuant to a no-fault
divorce has often been left to judicial determination.”).
164. See Swisher, supra note 131, at 303 (acknowledging several state courts and
state legislatures consider fault in divorce or dissolution of marriage, even when the
parties use a no-fault divorce path).
165. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1512
(2019); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203 (2019).
Interestingly, Arizona allows for the consideration of damages arising from domestic
abuse insofar as the damages add to monetary assets.
166. ALA. CODE § 30-2-52 (2019) (misconduct may be considered); ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.24.160 (2019) (conduct may be considered); IDAHO CODE § 32-705 (2019); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112 (2018) (requires taking into account instances of domestic
abuse but the abuser can still receive money); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 208 § 34 (2019);
MO. REV. STAT. § 452.335 (2019); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-130 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-41 (2019) (statute precludes fault in
property division; courts allow fault in alimony); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.052 (West
2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (West 2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (2019).
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California legislature but adopted this lower standard due to political
pressure. 167 The largest category is the third, which contains thirtythree states where the statutes are silent on marital fault and instead
allow judges to decide alimony using any other factors deemed
relevant. 168 Since the statutes in a majority of these jurisdictions do
not give any guidance as to whether domestic violence is a relevant
factor, judges must rely on cases that fluctuate on the issue, which
allows for almost unbridled judicial discretion. 169
California is the only state that falls into the final category, which
requires marital misconduct, specifically domestic violence, to be a
disqualifying factor for alimony determinations. 170 California passed
167. Compare H.B. 2105, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015) (proposing a law that
disqualifies alimony payments from survivors to abusers), with VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1
(allowing for the consideration of relevant circumstances, including domestic violence).
168. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (2019);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-82(a) (2019) (does not specifically mention misconduct);
D.C. CODE § 16-913 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (2019) (mentions only adultery
specifically but no other misconduct; other factors necessary to ensure justice and
fairness); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-1, 19-6-5 (2019) (specifically lists adultery and
desertion); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (2019); IND. CODE § 31-15-7-2 (2019); IOWA
CODE § 598.21A (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2902 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.200 (West 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A § 951-A (2019); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW
§ 11-106 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.23 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 518.552 (2019);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125.150 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (2019); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(A)(1)
(McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3A (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24.1
(2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 121
(2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (2018); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2019) (allows
for domestic violence to be considered in child support but not alimony); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-5-121 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 752 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.090 (2019); W. VA. CODE § 48-6-301 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 767.56 (2019); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 20-2-114 (2019).
169. See, e.g., Huggins v. Huggins, 331 So. 2d 704, 707 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)
(holding evidence of fault is not permitted in making alimony determinations);
Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 210 N.W.2d 352, 356–67 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)
(allowing husband’s abuse to be considered in determining alimony award); Carter
v. Carter, 413 A.2d 55, 56 (R.I. 1980) (ruling wife’s cruelty and substance use issues
were relevant factors in terminating alimony payments from her ex-husband); see also
In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972) (declining to allow fault
considerations for alimony); Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356, 1357–58 (Me. 1980)
(holding marital misconduct was not to be discussed in alimony considerations).
170. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4325 (West 2019); Sarah Burkett, Finding Fault and Making
Reparations: Domestic Violence Conviction as a Limitation on Spousal Support Award, 22 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 492, 493 (2015) (“Section 4325 . . . creates a presumptive bar
to alimony for spouses convicted of domestic violence, and supports other recently
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section 4325 in 2002 after years of courts considering domestic
violence to be largely irrelevant in no-fault divorce proceedings. 171
California legislators, upset by the common occurrence of domestic
violence survivors being forced to pay alimony to their abusers,
emphasized the unconscionability of the situation when passing the
bill. 172 In 2013, the California legislature made amendments to other
sections of its alimony laws, including barring alimony payments from a
victim to an abuser convicted of a violent sexual felony.173
Section 4325 has received considerable attention from California
courts.174 Courts interpret section 4325 narrowly, invalidating payments
only in cases where there was either a felony or misdemeanor conviction
for domestic violence.175 Furthermore, it seems no case exists where the
abuser was able to overcome the presumption and be granted alimony.176
As previously discussed, others have argued for similar legislation in their
respective states, but these efforts have not yet been successful. 177

added provisions in the alimony statutes that respond to domestic violence in the
context of divorce.”).
171. Stasia Rudiman, Domestic Violence as an Alimony Contingency: Recent Developments
in California Law, 22 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 498, 499–502 (2015) (explaining
efforts in California to include domestic violence as a consideration in alimony
awards, beginning with a 1995 amendment that disqualified one spouse who had
attempted to kill the other from receiving payments).
172. Burkett, supra note 170, at 493.
173. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4324.5 (2019).
174. See Rudiman, supra note 171, at 504.
175. In re Marriage of Kelkar, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905, 907–08 (2014) (terminating
abuser’s alimony award upon evidence of a nolo contendere plea for misdemeanor
battery); In re Marriage of Freitas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 459–60 (2012) (terminating
abuser’s alimony award upon evidence of a nolo contendere plea for felony domestic
violence charges); In re Marriage of Cauley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 902, 906 (2006) (holding
a spousal support agreement unenforceable so that respondent would not “finance
his own abuse by appellant”).
176. See Burkett, supra note 170, at 496.
177. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The relevant Louisiana and
Pennsylvania statutes specifically mention considering instances of domestic violence,
but do not make a conviction disqualifying. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 112 (2018)
(requiring the court to consider instances of domestic abuse but permitting the
abuser to still receive money); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701 (2019) (stating that
marital misconduct is not relevant, except in cases of abuse). See generally Deborah J.
Morris, Note, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do”: Proposing Legislative Action in Order to Address
the Problems Surrounding Alimony and Related Divorce Matters in South Dakota, 61 S.D. L.
REV. 81 (2016) (arguing that South Dakota should codify factors that judges must
consider when determining alimony to protect against unfair, discretionary decisions).
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F. The Psychological Impact of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence creates power dynamics in a relationship that
carry over to alimony negotiations. Understanding the trauma
domestic violence victims experience explains their state of mind in
these negotiations. Unsurprisingly, domestic violence has a lasting
impact on survivors’ mental, emotional, and physical health. 178
Studies have found that women who have endured intimate partner
violence are statistically more likely to develop illnesses such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression in addition to a
range of other chronic, life-threatening health conditions. 179
Naturally, psychiatric conditions such as PTSD change the way the brain
and body react and process events or feelings.180 Individuals diagnosed
with PTSD can have a range of symptoms including “involuntary
reexperiencing of the trauma (e.g., nightmares, intrusive thoughts),
avoidance of reminders and numbing of responsivity (e.g., not being able
to have loving feelings), and increased arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping or
concentrating, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response).”181
Typically, these PTSD symptoms are brought on by “triggers,”
which can be sights, sounds, smells, people, or places that conjure up
memories of past trauma. 182 The part of the brain that regulates the
human response to stimuli, the amygdala, remembers that the
particular trigger was involved in a previous negative experience and
178. Agnes Tiwari, Domestic Violence from a Health Perspective: Impact and Intervention,
in PREVENTING FAMILY VIOLENCE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 221, 221–25 (KoLing Chan ed., 2012).
179. See id. at 224 (“In the same meta-analysis, the weighted mean prevalence of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was 63.8%, which is also higher than the
lifetime rates of between 1.3% and 12.3% in general populations of women.”). While
domestic violence affects all people regardless of gender, race, or sexual orientation,
this Article refers to women because they experience domestic abuse at statistically
higher levels. See Domestic Violence Facts, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., https://www.
feminist.org/other/dv/dvfact.html#notes [https://perma.cc/362S-4UAY].
180. BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN
THE HEALING OF TRAUMA 62–63 (2014) (explaining how trauma upsets the balance
between the amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex, making it harder for individuals
with PTSD to control their emotions and impulses).
181. Emily J. Ozer & Daniel S. Weiss, Who Develops Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, 13
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 169, 169 (2004); see also Tiwari, supra note 178, at
224 (documenting the prevalence of PTSD).
182. LINDA SCHUPP, ASSESSING AND TREATING TRAUMA AND PTSD 18 (2d ed. 2015);
see also VAN DER KOLK, supra note 180, at 67 (explaining how these reactions to
triggers are largely outside of a person’s control and can manifest in different ways as
a result of different types of trauma).
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tells the hypothalamus to react accordingly. 183 This reaction is known
as the Flight, Fight, Freeze (FFF) response. 184 Once the FFF response
is activated in people with PTSD, they may panic and flee from the
situation or they may dissociate and lose all ability to think, speak, or
feel because the trigger has forced them to relive their prior
traumatic experiences. 185
Reliving a traumatic event can take a toll on an individual’s brain
and body. According to psychiatrists, reliving a traumatic event can
be worse than the event itself. 186 The adversarial divorce process will
trigger memories of physical or emotional abuse for a victim, forcing
them to relive traumatic events. This cycle of emotional turmoil
severely impairs an individual’s ability to advocate for themselves.
II. DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS THAT CONTAIN ALIMONY PAYMENTS FROM
THE INJURED SPOUSE TO THE ABUSER ARE UNCONSCIONABLE UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Family court judges should more frequently utilize the doctrine of
unconscionability because it fairly and justly resolves disputes, goals
that are shared with the family court system. 187 As discussed above,
unconscionability began as an equitable doctrine as a way to protect
“the widowed or weak-minded” and those who needed extrajudicial

183. SCHUPP, supra note 182, at 18, 20, 21; VAN DER KOLK, supra note 180, at 66.
184. Sarah Katz & Deeya Haldar, The Pedagogy of Trauma-Informed Lawyering, 22
CLIN. L. REV. 359, 366 (2016) (explaining how the FFF response relates to trauma,
which can in turn affect how clients relate to their attorneys and the court system);
Braive, The Fight Flight Freeze Response, YOUTUBE (Mar. 31, 2016), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jEHwB1PG_-Q (detailing the body’s biological FFF
response); see also VAN DER KOLK, supra note 180, at 72 (discussing how reliving an
event can cause several reactions including depersonalization which means the
individual has shut down to preserve and protect herself).
185. See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 180, at 67 (providing several examples of how
individuals may experience an traumatic flashback); SCHUPP, supra note 182, at 20
(describing the body’s panic response during a traumatic experience).
186. See VAN DER KOLK, supra note 180, at 66–67.
187. See Bryan, supra note 110, at 1238–40 (explaining how judges are required to
review divorce settlements before approving them but rarely do a close reading and
simply serve as a rubber stamp); see also Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting
It Right between Rhetoric and Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 13 (2009) (explaining
the founders of family courts envisioned a system that sought to effectively assist,
support, and protect children and families). If the goal of family courts is to support and
assist families, judges should take a more active role in achieving that by using the
authority they are given to stop unfair agreements before these agreements are approved.
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protection. 188 Unsurprisingly, both alimony and family law further
similar objectives. 189 Given that family courts are equitable in nature,
and courts consider alimony to be an equitable remedy upon divorce,
applying the doctrine of unconscionability to alimony provisions in
divorce settlements is not only appropriate but also fair. 190 Regardless
of the type of divorce, courts should prohibit abusers from receiving
alimony payments from their former partners when the former
partner has a domestic violence conviction. These alimony provisions
are unconscionable given the extraordinary imbalance in bargaining
power; physical, mental, or emotional imbalance between the parties;
absence of meaningful choice on the part of the victim; and presence
of contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to the abuser.
A. Survivors Lack Meaningful Choice When Entering into Settlements that
Require Them to Pay Alimony to Their Abusers
The first element of an unconscionability defense is lack of
meaningful choice. The unconscionability defense frequently arises
in cases where consumers have entered into adhesion contracts, or
contracts that are uniform across an industry, leaving the consumers
no option but to take the unfavorable terms. 191 Adhesion contracts
are unfavorable because they give the drafting party unbridled power
and prevent the signing party from modifying or negotiating the
terms. 192 In both Carlson and Henningsen, the courts looked at the
standard practice of utilizing adhesion contracts across the car
industry and found that this “take it or leave it” system greatly
disadvantaged consumers. 193 Allowing corporations to have a
monopoly over the industry with little recourse for injured patrons
188. Quraishi, supra note 33, at 192; see supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also Vivian Hamilton, Principles
of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 32, 42 (2006) (“Some of the legal rules
affecting marriage and divorce reflect the concept of contract, and many of the developments
in these family law rules aim to further equality and individual self-determination.”).
190. See Hamilton, supra note 189, at 65 (“[Couples] have more freedom . . . to
alter by contract the financial consequences attendant to the dissolution of their
marriage. Even these contracts, however, often are scrutinized by courts to ensure
that their enforcement would not offend public policy.”).
191. See supra notes 76–88 and accompanying text.
192. Allison E. McClure, Comment, The Professional Presumption: Do Professional
Employees Really Have Equal Bargaining Power When They Enter into Employment-Related
Adhesion Contracts?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1499–1500 (2006).
193. Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 295–96 (4th Cir. 1989);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 89 (N.J. 1960).
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troubled both courts for good reason. While these cases did not
involve interpersonal relationships or divorce settlements, courts have
identified problems with adhesion contracts in employment
contracts, among other situations. 194
As discussed above, the court in Williams held aggrieved parties had
a meaningful choice if, in light of all the circumstances, they had the
opportunity to decide whether and how to enter into the contract. 195
The court stated that if the parties, given their obvious education or lack
thereof, had a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract then, absent any presence of deceptive sales practices or hidden
terms, the parties meaningfully chose to enter into the deal.196
Applying this test to alimony provisions in divorce settlements,
abused spouses clearly lack meaningful choice. Domestic violence has
a significant impact on victims’ abilities to participate in settlement
negotiations. 197 Abused spouses may feel as if they do not have the
ability to advocate for their own self-interest or may not be
comfortable expressing their needs. 198 If this is the case, abused
spouses may be unable to decide whether and how they want to
resolve the alimony dilemma. On top of that, continued exposure to
the perpetrators coupled with frequent discussion of the trauma
poses a mental and emotional safety threat to abused spouses,
thereby further weakening their ability to participate fully in the
process and comprehend the severity of what they agreed to. 199 In
addition, a triggering event could further disadvantage abused
spouses. Abused spouses may be triggered by something as innocuous
as a ceiling fan, the clicking of a pen, or someone’s cologne. If during
194. See McClure, supra note 192, at 1506–07.
195. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
see McClure, supra note 192, at 1502–03 (analyzing the Williams decision).
196. 350 F.2d at 449.
197. See Linda Neilson, At Cliff’s Edge: Judicial Dispute Resolution in Domestic Violence
Cases, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 529, 537 (2014) (“In addition is the concern that exposure to
domestic violence has created a heightened susceptibility to settlement suggestion
that could negatively affect the settlement process.”); Bryan, supra note 110, at 1219–
21 (stating that in the instance of an abusive spouse, the control exercised by the
abusive spouse can make it difficult for the abused spouse to meaningfully contribute
to divorce negotiations).
198. See Neilson, supra note 197, at 534 (“Mental health experts tell us that harm
from domestic violence can create a psychological inability, particularly in stressful
surroundings, to recall, much less disclose, harmful, traumatic events.”).
199. Id. at 540 (discussing how evaluating abused spouses is imperative in making
a determination on whether they can participate fully and equitably in negotiations);
Bryan, supra note 110, at 1219–22.
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settlement discussions a trigger appears, their ability to negotiate, let
alone be mentally present, vanishes. 200
The time after leaving an abusive situation is the most
dangerous. 201 Given what is known about the FFF response and a
trauma survivor’s heightened sense of self-preservation, 202 abused
spouses may be willing to agree to anything to escape their abusers
and protect themselves as quickly as possible. 203 Victims do not fully
understand or recognize the gravity of a situation when they may be
looking for the quickest way out. The Williams court designed their
test to prevent this exact situation. 204
Furthermore, alimony is largely unpredictable, unreliable, and
discretionary. 205 Survivors have no choice but to acquiesce, as not
paying would hold them in contempt of a court order, leading to
future legal proceedings. 206 This internal psychological battle is
analogous to a consumer purchasing a car and adhering to
unfavorable terms because the consumer lacks the ability to procure
a better deal elsewhere. Much like in Carlson and Henningsen where
the purchasers had to accept limitations on liability as that was
standard industry practice, survivors have no other meaningful choice
but to pay their abusers, especially in states that refuse to consider
200. See supra Section I.F; see also Bryan, supra note 110, at 1231 (describing how
PTSD can make battered women seem unreliable to courts).
201. Why Do Victims Stay?, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay [https://perma.cc/9S8P-EDLY] (explaining
the risks associated with leaving an abusive relationship because of the abuser’s
continued desire to control the victim). Furthermore, studies have also shown that
an abuser’s access to a firearm significantly contributes to a victim’s lack of safety. See
Jessie Van Amburg, This Is How Many Women and Families are Affected by Domestic
Violence, TIME (June 2, 2016), http://time.com/4354035/domestic-violence-statistics
[https://perma.cc/RDB7-YQ55] (“If there is a gun in a household where there
is a domestic violence situation, the risk of homicide jumps by 500%.”). See
generally N AT ’ L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FACT SHEET: GUNS AND
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
https://www.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/guns_and_
dv0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFC8-2TDH] (describing how firearms can be
used to control survivors of domestic violence).
202. See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text; Bryan, supra note 110, at 1231–32.
203. Neilson, supra note 197, at 541.
204. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (holding that a contract should be considered “in light of the circumstances
existing when the contract was made,” including whether a contracting party had a
meaningful choice in the transaction).
205. See McMullen, supra note 136, at 49–51 (stating that alimony does not have clear
principles in the ways other aspects of divorce do and that results vary in each case).
206. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
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marital abuse in alimony determinations. 207 More troubling is that in
states where judges may consider any additional factors but decide
that domestic abuse is not relevant, victims are again faced with the
difficult situation of following a court order to their detriment. 208
Even if victims move to set aside the settlement, courts may not
reconsider, thus leaving the victims stuck with what they had
signed. 209 Consequently, in most jurisdictions, victims face an
outcome where they must pay alimony to their abusers. 210 This lack of
ability to find a more favorable alternative was central to the court’s
holding in Henningsen. 211 As such, this is a “take it or leave it” system
because survivors are legally bound to cooperate, satisfying the first
element of unconscionability.
However, courts are particularly wary of finding a lack of
meaningful choice given their preference for freedom of contract. 212
If judges determine abused spouses did meaningfully agree to the
unfavorable settlement agreement, the abused spouses can still
overcome the decision upon a showing of unequal bargaining power. 213
The next section provides arguments proving unequal bargaining power
is prevalent in alimony negotiations between abusers and victims.

207. Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 295–96 (4th Cir. 1989);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 89 (N.J. 1960); see supra note
165 and accompanying text.
208. See In re Williams Marriage, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972) (declining to
allow fault considerations for alimony); Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d 1356, 1358 (Me.
1980) (holding marital abuse was not to be discussed in alimony considerations);
Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997) (finding that marital
abuse may only be considered to the extent it caused economic harm to one spouse).
209. See Bryan, supra note 110, at 1239–40 (noting how women are unlikely to win
on motions to set aside or vacate a divorce settlement).
210. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4325 (2019).
211. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 89 (N.J. 1960).
212. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900)
(explaining courts should maintain and enforce contracts).
213. McClure, supra note 192, at 1502.

284

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:253

B. Gross Inequity in Bargaining Power Between Survivor and Abuser Leaves
the Survivor Unable to Properly Negotiate a Settlement
Typically, in cases involving unconscionability, the relationship is
between either a corporation and an average citizen 214 or a
corporation and a party with less resources or education. 215 However,
courts have also recognized unequal bargaining power in
interpersonal relationships. 216 In such cases, taking into account the
parties’ education, relationship, and resources is relevant in an
inquiry about the power dynamics. For example, in Wollums, the
court paid special attention to the fact that the plaintiff who sold his
house at an unfair price was elderly, disabled, uneducated, and
relatively poor compared to the business-savvy, wealthy buyer. 217 The
Williams and Waters courts focused on similar facts. In Williams, the
plaintiff was an uneducated, single mother of seven children on
public assistance. 218 In Waters, the plaintiff was mentally unwell and
was suffering from a substance abuse disorder, which her boyfriend
encouraged. 219 In each of these cases, the courts found that the
disadvantaged parties did not stand a chance in advocating for
themselves against their more powerful counterparts, whether it was a
corporation, 220 a businessman, 221 or a manipulative ex-boyfriend. 222
Some will argue the above alimony cases were not examples of
unequal bargaining power because the victims were both the higherearning spouse and were likely supported by counsel. While women
are statistically more likely to be victims of abuse 223 and are also more

214. See Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 295–96 (4th Cir. 1989);
Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 86.
215. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
216. See Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Mass. 1992); see also
Wollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W. 781, 781–82 (Ky. 1892) (holding buyer, an experienced
businessman, took advantage of seller, an older gentleman with little education,
during private contract for seller’s home).
217. 20 S.W. at 781.
218. 350 F.2d at 448.
219. 587 N.E.2d at 232.
220. Carlson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 295–96 (4th Cir. 1989);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960).
221. 20 S.W. at 781.
222. 587 N.E.2d at 232.
223. COLO. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF
ABUSE—OR NOT?; UNDERSTANDING THE REALITY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL ASSAULT,
https://www.violencefreecolorado.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ CCADV-CCASAFact-Sheet-on-Myth-of-False-Allegations_updated-2.21.14.pdf
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likely to be awarded alimony than to pay it, 224 the rise of female
employment and educational attainment increases the likelihood that
courts will order female victims of domestic abuse to pay alimony. 225
Furthermore, as Wollums and Waters demonstrate, the victim is the one
with an advantage given the victim’s financial stability. Of course, this
poses the question: if all of these facts exist, can the higher-earning spouse
with arguably more resources really be the party with less power? The
answer to that question is yes, especially in cases of domestic violence.226
Domestic violence is analogous to the power imbalance in all of the
unconscionability cases because the very nature of abusive
relationships puts survivors on unequal footing. 227 Abusive
relationships are all about power and control; abusers exert control
over victims through physical, sexual, or psychological abuse,
commanding every facet of victims’ lives.228 Unsurprisingly, victims stay
in abusive relationships because they fear leaving, have no access to their

[https://perma.cc/P6GK-JUPH]; Mary Ann Dutton & Catherine L. Waltz, Domestic
Violence, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 14, 14 (1995).
224. See McMullen, supra note 136, at 58.
225. Id. at 54 (highlighting that between 1970 and 2007 the percentage of
husbands who had wives with a higher income rose from 4 percent to 22 percent).
While this Comment does not focus on either heterosexual or same-sex marriages,
the probability of a woman paying alimony may be especially likely in same-sex
marriages. Same-sex couples experience domestic violence at nearly the same rates as, or
potentially more than, those in heterosexual relationships. See CTR. AM. PROGRESS, LGBT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 1 (2011), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/domestic_violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/D23L-5TCJ]. Female
same-sex couples are also more likely to have one partner earn significantly more than the
other, given the comparatively high incomes of lesbian women. See Danielle Paquette, The
Surprising Reason Why Lesbians Get Paid More Than Straight Women, WASH. POST (Feb.
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/25/thesurprising-reason-why-lesbians-get-paid-more-than-straight-women. While few studies
focus on same-sex intimate partner violence, it is reasonable to believe that a victim
may have to pay alimony to an abuser.
226. See infra notes 236–44 and accompanying text; see also Brinig, supra note 118,
at 549–50 (explaining that, in a family law context, fault-based circumstances were more
material in the outcome of settlements than typical factors such as income or wealth).
227. See Steve Mulligan, Redefining Domestic Violence: Using the Power and Control
Paradigm for Domestic Violence Legislation, 29 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 33, 35 (2009)
(explaining the power and control model where abusers employ a range of
techniques to assert total dominance over a victim).
228. Types of Abuse, WOMEN AGAINST ABUSE, http://www.womenagainstabuse.org/
education-resources/learn-about-abuse/types-of-domestic-violence
[https://perma.cc/R5D5-5WJ8].
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bank accounts, or lack support from friends or public resources.229
Domestic violence is characterized by a pattern of coercive behaviors
utilized to isolate and dominate a victim. 230 Abusers employ these
isolation techniques as a means of annihilating a victim’s autonomy
and self-worth. 231 The result is a person who has lived for years in an
alternate reality created and controlled by their perpetrator. 232
Clearly, people who have endured years of “or else” threats and
coercive control will be conditioned to agree to their abusers’
demands because resistance or disagreement has never been a viable
option. With such profound and lasting effects on self-esteem and
agency present, the benefits of settling and negotiating alimony are
virtually non-existent. 233 When individuals have lived through an
abusive relationship that has eroded their ability to stand up for
themselves, they are, by default, at a disadvantage from the moment
they approach the bargaining table. 234 Even if victims are supported
by counsel, they are unlikely to be able to advocate for their own
interests because of the toll the abuse has taken on their ability to
make choices or communicate their needs. 235
Financial abuse can further weaken a victim’s bargaining power. In
cases where the battered spouse is the breadwinner, it is not
necessarily true that she has an advantage over the abuser. More
plausibly, the victim did not have access to her finances or have
control over monetary decisions for the duration of the
relationship. 236 Financial control is a common form of psychological
abuse and can have detrimental effects on the victim. 237 Examples of
229. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 47
fig.4.3 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8UF-99Z9] (41% of female victims reported having an intimate
partner control their ability to make decisions and 22% of female victims reported
having an intimate partner control their income).
230. Kristy Candela, Note, Protecting the Invisible Victim: Incorporating Coercive Control
in Domestic Violence Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112, 115 (2016).
231. See Mulligan, supra note 227, at 36.
232. See Candela, supra note 230, at 115.
233. See Bryan, supra note 110, at 1223.
234. Id. (suggesting that despite mediators’ claims to balance power, balancing
power in an abusive relationship can be impossible).
235. Bryan, supra note 110, at 1180–83.
236. See Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit
Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 374 (2013).
237. Id.; see also Some Abusers Are Getting Awarded Alimony: How an Archaic Alimony
Law Further Victimizes Survivors, DOMESTIC SHELTERS (Nov. 22, 2017),
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financial control include “preventing the victim’s access to joint bank
accounts; forcing the victim to deposit income into accounts
controlled solely by the abuser; putting the victim on an allowance;
and preventing the victim from accessing financial information—
both about her household’s finances and about personal finances
generally.” 238 Victims may also be in extreme debt without knowing. 239
If the abuser has used one or more of these tactics, the victim has been
relying on him for money despite her higher income. If this is the
victim’s reality, she may be unable to afford an attorney, and even if
she can, she may run out of money if the abuser uses these tactics to
unnecessarily exhaust any legal funds she has access to. 240 Predictably,
feelings of hopelessness and helplessness are quite common among
victims given the diminished control they have over their lives. 241
Earning more money is useless if victims are unable to access it and use
it to their advantage. The situation is futile for victims, leaving them
worse off in a fight against formidable opponents.
The Waters case most clearly demonstrates this point. In Waters, the
plaintiff’s boyfriend used his control over the plaintiff to convince
her to sell a large portion of her assets. 242 Despite the fact that the
plaintiff was more financially stable than her boyfriend and could
arguably afford a decent attorney, the court still found the deal
unconscionable because of the boyfriend’s coercive tactics. 243
Furthermore, the court paid special attention to the plaintiff’s mental
state, noting that her boyfriend had forced her to use drugs and
financially abused her by maxing out her credit cards, putting her into
debt. 244 When she contracted to sell her assets, she was “represented”
by her boyfriend, meaning he controlled the negotiations, and she had
no choice but to agree to his terms. 245 The parties clearly did not have
equal bargaining power. Applying this case to alimony settlements
demonstrates sufficient evidence supports a finding that victims
https://www.domesticshelters.org/articles/in-the-news/some-abusers-are-gettingawarded-alimony [https://perma.cc/R4PD-G93M] (discussing how an abuser’s
control of family finances and resources can isolate the abused spouse).
238. Littwin, supra note 236, at 374.
239. See Littwin, supra note 236, at 365 (introducing the idea of “coerced debt,”
described as when an abuser uses the victim’s credit “via fraud or duress”).
240. See Bryan, supra note 110, at 1175–76.
241. See Dutton & Waltz, supra note 223, at 17–18.
242. Waters v. Min, Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 232 (Mass. 1992).
243. Id. at 234.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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approach settlement negotiations at an inherent disadvantage,
satisfying the second element of unconscionability and disproving
arguments to the contrary.
An abuser’s ability to manipulate a survivor’s weakened mental an
emotional state to procure a better deal contributes to unequal
bargaining power between the parties. Courts will usually find
unconscionability when one party takes advantage of the other’s
relatively weakened position or mental state to procure a better
deal. 246 In Odorizzi, the court rescinded the plaintiff’s resignation
because the school administrators used the plaintiff’s diminished
mental state, lack of sleep, and personal anxiety to force his
resignation. 247 The administrators preyed upon the fact that the
plaintiff was unable to think clearly or make rational decisions to get
the outcome most favorable for them. 248 Similarly, in Waters, the
plaintiff was highly susceptible to influence given her injuries from a car
accident at a young age and her impaired judgment from persistent
drug use that was encouraged by her boyfriend.249 Her boyfriend
convinced her to sign onto an unfair deal knowing he could use her
debilitated state to get his friends and himself a bargain.250
Abusive relationships are analogous to cases where one party is
susceptible to undue influence, mostly because abusers will play on
victims’ fear and shame to keep victims quiet or procure a more
favorable deal. 251 Much like substance use disorders or other mental
illnesses, domestic violence and traumatic experiences bear
significantly on victims’ mental and emotional state. 252 Because
victims will likely be triggered by speaking to or about their abuser,
they will likely dissociate or relive their trauma during alimony
negotiations. 253 When in that state of mind, the rational part of the
brain shuts down completely and the amygdala and hypothalamus,
often referred to as the animal parts of the brain, take over. 254 In such
a situation, victims would be rendered unable to ask questions, think,

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
Id.
Id.
587 N.E.2d at 232.
Id.
See Bryan, supra note 110, at 1220–21; Neilson, supra note 197, at 537.
See supra Section I.F.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
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or present facts without severe mental distress. 255 Many abusers would
likely take advantage of that reaction because it gives them continued
power and control over the victim.256 Most jurisdictions bar couples with
a history of domestic violence from participating in mediation or dispute
resolution for these exact reasons. 257 Because of the nature of trauma,
survivors cannot possibly approach negotiations on a level playing field.
C. Divorce Settlements that Require Alimony Payments Are Unreasonably
One-Sided
Courts determine the final element of an unconscionability
defense, an unreasonably one-sided bargain, by looking at the totality
of the circumstances, particularly in terms of the agreement itself. In
both Campbell Soup Co. and Miller, the courts were concerned by
clauses in the contract that had clearly been drawn by the more
sophisticated party and were so unfair that no reasonable person
would have agreed to such terms.258 Even in the other cases previously
discussed, the courts seemed to focus on how the contracts were so
lopsided in one party’s favor that the other party had not likely
consented to or actually understood the severity of the deal. 259
Particularly, Williams clearly defined a standard for unreasonably onesided contracts, stating terms that are “so extreme as to appear
unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time

255. See Neilson, supra note 197, at 537 (“Domestic violence can cause long-term
heightened apprehension, lingering fear, as well as [sic] host of psychological harms
resulting in reduced self-esteem, reduced ability to respond assertively and to
withstand settlement pressure, as well as a number of psychological conditions that
can only be diagnosed by a mental health professional.”).
256. See Burkett, supra note 170, at 497.
257. See Bryan, supra note 110, at 1223 (“If the battered wife and her abusing
husband settle their divorce dispute through mediation, the likelihood of an unfair
custody and/or financial agreement increases.”); Neilson, supra note 197, at 532
(noting the “the potential for psychological harm from renewed contact with an
abuser, expanded opportunities for violators to maintain contact, to intimidate and
to control or to delay final decisions; and the potential for suppression of concerns
about domestic violence and safety” as reasons for not using mediation for couples
with a history of abuse).
258. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948); Miller v.
Coffeen, 280 S.W.2d 100, 105–06 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
259. See Waters v. Min, Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Mass. 1992) (finding the
boyfriend’s representation of the plaintiff in the agreement was used to manipulate
her into signing a contract that benefitted the boyfriend at plaintiff’s detriment).
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and place” are unenforceable.260 Contracts, as noted earlier, require a
bargain.261 In these cases, a bargain is non-existent because one party has
all the benefit while the other gets nearly nothing in return.
Applying the standard from Williams, requiring domestic violence
survivors to pay alimony to their abusers goes against the mores and
business practices of today’s society. Domestic violence has been an
issue of grave concern in this country for decades. 262 The most
notable legislation on the topic is the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), 263 which was passed by Congress based on social science
research and public outcry over the harmful effects of gender-based
violence. 264 Reform efforts geared toward helping victims of domestic
violence also garnered support at the state and local level, in part
because of increased attention to the prevalence of abuse and
trauma. 265 These reforms have continued well into the twenty-first
century, most recently leading to the #MeToo movement, which has
worked on changing the power dynamics in many industries and
sparked reform in various areas of law. 266 In particular, several
different business sectors have taken reform initiatives towards
reducing workplace sexual harassment and assault. 267 Given this
260. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(quoting 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963)).
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
262. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence Law Reform in the Twenty-First Century:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, 42 FAM. L.Q. 353, 354–56 (2008) (discussing the
history of domestic violence abuse recognition in the United States).
263. 34 U.S.C. §§ 12291–512 (2012).
264. H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) as reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853 (describing the effects intimate partner violence has on
women and children); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 28 (1990) (“The purpose of the
Violence Against Women Act of 1990 is to provide the kind of comprehensive
response to violent crime that American women need today.”).
265. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993)
(“Largely in response to the women’s movement in the late 60’s and the 70’s, significant
legal reform efforts in the past twenty years have been directed at ending domestic
violence and creating a broad array of legal remedies for battered women.”).
266. North, supra note 2.
267. See Jordain Carney, Senate Approves Bill Reforming Congress’s Sexual Harassment
Policy, THE HILL (Dec. 13, 2018, 11:01 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
421207-senate-approves-bill-reforming-congresss-sexual-harassment-policy
[https://perma.cc/NG2U-6Q8Q]; Rebecca Beitsch, #MeToo Has Changed Our Culture.
Now It’s Changing Our Laws, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (July 31, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/07/31/ metoohas-changed-our-culture-now-its-changing-our-laws [https://perma.cc/WB37-G2MY].
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extensive outpouring of support for improved domestic violence and
sexual harassment policies and the clear statement from businesses
that gender-based violence and harassment will no longer be
tolerated, judges could readily find that alimony payments from
victims to abusers go against the standards of today’s society.
Additionally, much like the lopsided bargains in Campbell Soup Co.
and Miller, 268 alimony payments from abused spouses to abusers are
unreasonably hard on victims. These agreements give a clear benefit
to abusers, as they not only continue wielding power and control over
the victims but also get to do so while getting paid. 269 Victims do not
see a single benefit from such an agreement. Victims will be forced to
relive their experiences; they will be retraumatized by simply knowing
that they are still beholden to the person they physically escaped
from, and they will be faced with legal consequences if they do not
perform accordingly. As above, a multitude of factors forced the
victim into such a situation; however, there remains a general
consensus that the reasonable person would never agree to such a
provision.270 Enforcement of these payments, as the court found in Miller,
goes against notions of justice and fairness, rendering them unconscionable
and accordingly, unenforceable, satisfying the final element.271
D. Forcing Survivors to Pay Alimony to Their Abusers Contradicts Public
Policy
States that adopt a system disqualifying alimony payments from survivors
to abusers have several public policy incentives to do so. Adopting
legislation like California’s sets a clear standard that the state has a zerotolerance domestic violence policy and removes the unpredictability of
judicial discretion while also providing clear guidelines for when alimony
should be disqualified.272 Allowing mere “consideration” of domestic

268. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948); Miller v.
Coffeen, 280 S.W.2d 100, 105–06 (Mo. 1955) (en banc).
269. See Burkett, supra note 170, at 497.
270. See Neilson, supra note 197, at 546 (“Survivors of domestic violence report
acceptance of agreements that they do not believe sufficiently protect themselves or
their children, not so much as a consequence of direct threats . . . as much as from
lack of self-esteem, fear, manipulation, harm from domestic violence and the
psychological need to escape from these relationships as quickly as possible.”).
271. See Miller, 280 S.W.2d at 105–06 (finding that when there is “shockingly
inadequate consideration” for a contract, the terms of the contract are unenforceable).
272. See Burkett, supra note 170, at 497; see also supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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violence as a factor does not guarantee survivors will be victorious and still
presents issues of unconscionability and undue influence.273
However, given the conviction limitation, adopting a regime of this
nature has some fundamental issues. Domestic violence is greatly
underreported.274 Moreover, while some jurisdictions utilize mandatory
prosecution practices, many do not.275 In the latter situation, cases set for
trial are later often dropped because the victim refuses to approach the
stand, likely for valid health and safety concerns.276 In those cases,
evidence likely favors conviction, but prosecutors lose the opportunity to
obtain one.277 Consequently, despite an overwhelming amount of evidence
of abuse, victims would still have to pay alimony because their former
spouses are never formally convicted.
This legislation may encourage reporting by victims, addressing
some of those valid concerns. Under a prohibition on alimony
payments, victims may be more likely to seek convictions as doing so will
ensure they do not have to pay money to their abusers.278 Furthermore,
this policy may encourage individuals who were afraid to divorce their

273. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (listing state statutes that allow
consideration of domestic violence as a factor judges may consider).
274. See Neilson, supra note 197, at 538 (“[F]ew domestic violence incidents are
reported to police. Thus, the absence of a police record is not a reliable indicator
that serious coercive domestic violence has not occurred.”); see also S N, Domestic
Violence Statistics: 70% of Cases Go Unreported, MIC (July 12, 2012),
https://www.mic.com/articles/10919/domestic-violence-statistics-70-of-cases-gounreported [https://perma.cc/DXW9-QPMP] (demonstrating the low rate of
reporting in abuse and sexual violence cases).
275. See Sarah Lorraine Solon ed., Domestic Violence, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 369,
405 (2009) (discussing how some jurisdictions have adopted “no-drop” prosecution
policies, which limit prosecutorial discretion in pursuing domestic violence cases).
276. See Angela Corsilles, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases:
Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 857 (1994).
277. Id.
278. See Burkett, supra note 172, at 495. Burkett raises a few questions about
whether California’s alimony law would increase incidences of false reports by
abusers. While this is a common concern amongst individuals who are wary of
implementing a strict ban on alimony payments from survivor to abuser, it is
misguided. Research shows that an overwhelming majority, between 63% to 74%, of
domestic violence allegations in family court are truthful. See COLO. COALITION
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 223, at 1. Of the remaining one-third to onequarter of cases, only a small percentage have been found to be demonstrably false.
Id. (showing false domestic violence accusations track closely to low rates of false
rape allegations). Unfortunately, due to police investigative practices and confusing
legal standards, the bulk of the remaining claims have insufficient evidence to
support a finding for conviction. Id. at 2.
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abusers out of fear of overpaying alimony to finally leave an unhealthy
environment.279 However, most importantly, a system that prohibits
alimony payments from victims to abusers supports victims in their
healing and removes systematic re-traumatization.280
CONCLUSION
When domestic violence occurs and victims are finally able to
remove themselves from an abusive situation, the courts should offer
a place of support and safety. By allowing otherwise, courts are
adding insult to years of injury. After decades of legislative efforts to
promote better treatment of domestic violence victims in other areas
of the law, it is time for family law, specifically alimony, to catch up.
Forty-nine states have alimony statutes that permit abusers to receive
alimony payments from individuals they physically, mentally,
emotionally, and financially abused. The only state that precludes this
abhorrent policy is California. Since legislatures will not likely amend
their laws, 281 judges must wield their unbridled discretion and declare
alimony payments from victims to abusers unconscionable.
As a defense arising from courts of equity, unconscionability
provides a strong legal background for invalidating alimony payments
that are negotiated into divorce settlements. In analyzing the alimony
payments from abused to abuser, the practice evidently meets
modern standards of unconscionability. Domestic violence, as
discussed above, puts victims at a weaker mental state and lowers
bargaining capacity, making it difficult for them to adequately agree
and negotiate settlements. Additionally, forcing victims to advocate
for their needs and discuss their trauma in the presence of their
perpetrator is retraumatizing and may discourage them from
disclosing relevant information. 282
In ordering survivors to pay alimony to the people they may have
been trying to escape for years, the system forces renewed contact
between victims and abusers while also putting survivors’ health and
safety at risk. Survivors, willing to do anything to get away from their
tormentors, possibly did not fully understand the above consequences
when they signed the settlement agreement. Accordingly, holding the
279. Burkett, supra note 170, at 497.
280. See Katz & Haldar, supra note 184, at 365–66 (reporting the widespread
problem of family abuse and discussing the effects of trauma).
281. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
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alimony payments in the settlement valid and enforceable would be
unconscionable given the circumstances. As discussed above, courts do
not necessarily need to hold the entire settlement unenforceable
under the doctrine of severance. 283 The judge could simply strike the
alimony provision from the contract and allow the divorce to proceed
as normal. These alimony practices disproportionately harm domestic
violence survivors, so whether judges hold the entire settlement
invalid or just remove the offensive provision, the underlying
conclusion is that as a matter of contract law, courts should not
enforce the alimony agreements.
Survivors of domestic violence have endured enough at the hands
of their abusers. Survivors have been repeatedly coerced, isolated,
and traumatized, causing feelings of hopelessness and shame.
Reaching out and asking for help continues that pattern. The price
of freedom from abuse should not be the cost of an alimony award.
Forbidding these payments sends a clear signal to legislatures that
domestic violence will no longer be tolerated in the #MeToo era and
prevents courts from rewarding abusers at the victims’ expense.

283. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

